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INTRODUCTION 
“Arrested, put in the lineup, trying to put dents in my armor. But, I’m 
a survivor, plus I’m liver than most. Out on bail, fifty thou’, still riding 
with toast.”1 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by MILTON J. HERNANDEZ, IV. 
 1. JAY-Z, GUILTY UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT (Roc-A-Fella Records 2001). 
Jay-Z is a vocal advocate for bail bond reform and produced a series on the story 
of Kalief Browder, a young man who committed suicide after spending three years 
on Rikers Island awaiting trial. See Shawn Carter, Jay Z: For Father’s Day, I’m 




On June 20, 2017, Brian Gisclair stood before Judge Harry Cantrell in 
the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court in New Orleans, Louisiana.2 
The day before, New Orleans police officers stopped a vehicle in which 
Gisclair was a passenger.3 The officers claimed they saw a drug deal take 
place in the car.4 The police explained that after the transaction, Gisclair 
exited the car and discarded a small plastic bag filled with a “white 
rocklike substance.”5 The officers arrested Gisclair for felony possession 
of cocaine.6 
Gisclair was one of 20 recently arrested defendants in Judge Cantrell’s 
courtroom that day.7 Each defendant was making their initial appearance 
before the court.8 This initial appearance allowed each defendant to meet 
with an attorney, hear the charges made against his, and receive a bail 
amount.9 
Gisclair, like over 85% of criminal defendants in New Orleans, needed 
a public defender to represent him.10 Gisclair’s court-appointed attorney 
explained to Judge Cantrell that a cash bail was unnecessary because 
Gisclair had no prior violent crime convictions, was not a danger to the 
community, and would certainly return to court on his trial date.11 Further, 
his attorney mentioned that Gisclair had a job interview scheduled that day 
with an apartment complex.12 With a job application pending, the attorney 
argued, Gisclair was less likely to flee from the jurisdiction of the court if 
the judge released him on his own recognizance pretrial.13 Judge Cantrell, 
                                                                                                             
Taking on the Exploitative Bail Industry, TIME (June 16, 2017), http://time 
.com/4821547/jay-z-racism-bail-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/M6LC-7637]. 
 2. Bryce Covert, America Is Waking Up to the Injustice of Cash Bail, 
NATION (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/america-is-waking-
up-to-the-injustice-of-cash-bail/ [https://perma.cc/9UUU-CV3T]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. Gisclair was looking for a new job after being laid off four months 
earlier. Id. He was a resident of Westwego, Louisiana, where he had lived his 
whole life. Class Action Complaint at 5, Caliste v. Cantrell, No. 2:17-CV-06197, 
2018 WL 1365809 (E.D. La. Mar. 16, 2018). 




however, quickly issued a $2,500 bail for Gisclair—the minimum Judge 
Cantrell ever orders under his discretion.14 
Gisclair could not afford to pay the bail or to contract with a bail 
bondsman.15 He did not know anyone who could loan him the money.16 
The judge, therefore, remanded him to the Orleans Parish Prison jail.17 For 
weeks, Gisclair did not receive any information about his case, and he 
could not afford to call his fiancée and children.18 Gisclair remained in jail 
for 40 days and appeared in court on three more occasions before the jail 
released him.19 
Upon leaving jail, Gisclair called the apartment complex employer 
with whom he had scheduled the interview.20 After waiting a week to hear 
from Gisclair, the employer hired someone else for the maintenance 
position.21 Gisclair had to find temporary work and start over his attempt 
to build a more stable life for himself and his family.22 
Gisclair’s story is just one of many examples of how the for-profit cash 
bail system causes tremendous hardships for impoverished defendants.23 
Countless others fall into similar difficulties when courts give them a bail 
amount that they cannot afford and they are remanded to jail.24  
The United States has one of the highest incarceration rates in the 
world and has the highest per capita prison population among the world’s 
                                                                                                             
 14. Covert, supra note 2. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. See id. Later, Gisclair and co-plaintiff Adrian Caliste filed a class action 
complaint against Judge Harry Cantrell, “seeking a declaratory judgment that 
Judge Cantrell’s bond policy, which they assert results in the creation of a 
‘modern debtor’s prison,’ and financial conflict of interest are violations of [their] 
constitutional rights.” Caliste v. Cantrell, No. 17-6197, 2018 WL 3727768, at *1 
(E.D. La. Aug. 6, 2018). The court granted the plaintiffs’ summary judgment. Id. 
 24. See, e.g., NewsClips Database, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://university 
.pretrial.org/libraryup/newsclips [https://perma.cc/3WMA-WLSC]. The Pretrial 
Justice Institute provides a searchable spreadsheet of cases and stories related to 
cash bail systems’ detrimental effects on impoverished defendants. Id.; Avianne 
Tan, Kalief Browder: The Life and Death of the Man Who Spent 3 Years Without 
Trial on Rikers Island, ABC NEWS (June 9, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/US/kalief 
-browder-life-death-man-spent-years-trial/story?id=31643296 [https://perma.cc/9T 
G9-KUE4]. 




major economies.25 Approximately 450,000 of the United States’s county 
and city jail detainees—about 70% of the total county and city jail 
populations—are still awaiting trial.26 The number of defendants detained 
pretrial in the United States is larger than most other countries’ entire 
imprisoned population.27 Defendants are frequently detained pretrial for 
weeks, months, or even years because they cannot afford to pay the set 
bail.28 Louisiana is no exception.29  
Louisiana has the second highest per capita incarceration rate in the 
country.30 In 2015, approximately 1 of every 100 Louisianans were in 
                                                                                                             
 25. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. locks people up at a higher rate than any 
other country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com /news 
/fact-checker/wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any- 
other-country/?utm_term=.bfc795ddcb91 [https://perma.cc/V7DC-42Y4]. 
 26. $elling Off Our Freedom, COLOR OF CHANGE & ACLU’S CAMPAIGN FOR 
SMART JUSTICE 6 (2017), https://d11gn0ip9m46ig.cloudfront.net/images/059 
_Bail_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/82XG-VCQ3]. 
 27. Compare id., with Highest to Lowest, WORLD PRISON BRIEF, http://www 
.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_taxono 
my_tid=All [https://perma.cc/8SXR-TJJ7] (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). Note the 
distinction between total prison population, which encompasses all people 
detained, and total pretrial detention population, which is the number of people 
being detained before trial. See also Covert, supra note 2. 
 28. $elling Off Our Freedom, supra note 26. 
 29. See, e.g., LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, LA. JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS (2017). The Louisiana 
criminal justice system creates chilling stories of pretrial detention. See generally 
NewsClips Database, supra note 24 (searchable spreadsheet of cash-bail stories, 
including stories from Louisiana); see also Eve Abrams, If you pass through New 
Orleans courts, innocent or not, you still have to pay – 4, NEW ORLEANS PUB. RADIO 
(Feb. 17, 2016), http://wwno.org/post/if-you-pass-through-new-orleans-courts-inno 
cent-or-not-you-still-have-pay-4 [https://perma.cc/7NW5-773Z] (reporting on 
Reuben who, after contracting with a bail bondsman to pay his $5,500 bail, saw a 
judge increase his bail by another $5,000, forcing Reuben and his family to pay more 
to the bondsman; the court dropped Reuben’s case after he paid the premium on the 
second bail); see Katy Reckdahl, Lawsuit accuses New Orleans bail bond company 
of overcharging, NEW ORLEANS ADVOCATE (June 19, 2017), http://www.theadvocate 
.com/new_orleans/news/courts/article_6398b902-5528-11e7-8707-afdbcde77a50  
.html [https://perma.cc/SB36-7XES] (giving a description of the law suit against 
Blair’s Bail Bonds, who charged Ronald Egana and his family more than $6,000—
over double the normal premium amount for a bail of Ronald’s size). 
 30. See John Simerman, ‘Prison capital’ no more: Louisiana sheds long-held 
title, but remains above U.S. incarceration rate, ADVOCATE (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/article_65844992-6b53-11e8- 




parish and city jails—nearly triple the national average.31 That same year, 
about half of Louisiana’s jail inmates were being detained pretrial.32 
Furthermore, nearly all of Louisiana’s pretrial inmates remain in jail 
because they have not satisfied their bail payment.33 Spending unnecessary 
time in jail threatens the income, job security, and home life of many 
criminal defendants.34 Requiring defendants to pay bail, especially 
exorbitant amounts, perpetuates problems of poverty, recidivism, 
unwarranted guilty pleas, and high incarceration rates.35 
Several state, county, and municipal jurisdictions in the United States 
have abandoned cash bail systems, which require defendants to pay bail or 
risk detention in jail until their trial date.36 These jurisdictions are instead 
                                                                                                             
ac2d-97c9311b1424.html [https://perma.cc/39ZX-QQCY]. At the inception of 
this Comment, Louisiana had the highest per capita incarceration rate in the 
country. LA. JUSTICE REINVESTMENT TASK FORCE, supra note 29, at 12. 
 31. Incarceration Trends: Louisiana, VERA INST. JUST., http://trends.vera 
.org/rates/louisiana?incarcerationData=all [https://perma.cc/SSL7-646K] (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2018). This number is different from and does not include the number 
of people detained in Louisiana state prison facilities. Id. Generally speaking, jails are 
“[parish or county] operated short-term facilities” that detain defendants “awaiting 
trial or sentencing” or have been convicted of misdemeanors, and prisons are “longer-
term facilities run by the state or the federal government . . . .” What is the difference 
between jails and prisons, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index 
.cfm?ty=qa&iid=322 [https://perma.cc/YXY5-9LJ7] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 
 32. Incarceration Trends: Louisiana, supra note 31. In 2015, of the 28,696 
Louisianans that jails detained in these local facilities, they were holding 14,038 
of them pretrial. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Mathilde Laisne, Jon Wool & Christian Henrichson, Past Due: 
Examining the Costs and Consequences of Charging for Justice in New Orleans, 
VERA INST. OF JUST. (2017). 
 34. See, e.g., Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33; The Socioeconomic 
Impact of Pretrial Detention, OPEN SOC’Y JUST. INITIATIVE (2010), http://www 
.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/a2j-%20Socio  
economic%20impact%20of%20PTD%20OSI%20UNDP.pdf [https://perma.cc/X 
CU9-8NKH]; Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal Yang, The Effects of Pretrial 
Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from 
Randomly Assigned Judges (July 2016), http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cyang/files 
/dgy_bail_july2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V5D-WMMT]. 
 35. See Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33. 
 36. See generally infra Part II; Josie Duffy Rice, New Jersey passes new bail 
reform law, changing lives of poor defendants, DAILY KOS (Jan. 3, 2017), 
https://www.daily kos.com/stories/2017/1/3/1616714/-New-Jersey-passes-new-
bail-reform-law-changing-lives-of-poor-defendants [https://perma.cc/WLJ8-
7JWD]; Ann E. Marimow, When it comes to pretrial release, few other 
jurisdictions do it D.C.’s way, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washing 




adopting risk assessment tools that analyze each defendant’s criminal 
history, connections with the community, flight risk, and danger to society 
using mathematical algorithms.37 If a defendant is deemed high-risk based 
on these considerations, he is detained before his trial.38 If a defendant is 
considered low-risk, he is released on his own recognizance,39 and 
expected to return to court on his hearing date.40 Risk assessment tools are 
less expensive, more efficient, and fairer than cash bail systems for 
defendants, courts, and court agencies.41  
Louisiana should eliminate its cash bail system and adopt a statewide 
risk assessment-based system—the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety 
Assessment tool—so courts can calculate which defendants must be 
detained and which defendants can be safely released until trial.42 
Adopting such a system not only promotes equality by ensuring that courts 
do not target indigent defendants indiscriminately, but it also promotes 
public safety by ensuring that jails only release low-risk defendants 
pretrial.43 
Part I of this Comment provides background on the bail system in 
general and specifically in Louisiana. Part II discusses recent developments 
in bail reform in other jurisdictions around the country, particularly those 
adopting risk assessment-based systems. Part III argues that Louisiana 
should follow in the footsteps of the jurisdictions eliminating cash bail 
systems and adopt a similar risk assessment tool. Part III also analyzes jail 
data in Louisiana and argues that there are economic incentives for 
Louisiana’s parishes and cities to adopt this new system. This Comment 
concludes by imploring the Louisiana Legislature to eliminate the 
antiquated, inefficient cash bail system and adopt a risk assessment tool 
statewide like the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool. 
                                                                                                             
tonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-other-jurisd 
ictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_stor 
y.html?utm_term=.2a5b8a415f53 [https://perma.cc/SFE5-THM9]; PSA Research, 
LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., http:// 
www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/psa-research/ 
[https://perma.cc/VK9R-BVCC] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 
 37. See generally supra note 36. 
 38. See PSA Research, supra note 36. 
 39. “Release on recognizance” is defined as “[t]he pretrial release of an 
arrested person who promises . . . without supplying a surety or posting bond, to 
appear for trial at a later date.” Release on Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 40. See PSA Research, supra note 36. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See discussion infra Part III. 




I. LOUISIANA’S ARCHAIC CASH BAIL SYSTEM 
Cash bail systems, in which defendants must pay a specific amount of 
money or face pretrial detainment, are rooted in the foundation of Western 
civilizations.44 Anglo-Saxon England, the United States’s common law 
predecessor, used bail systems because of a general lack of prisons.45 
Without enough prison space, courts needed to be sure that defendants 
would return to court when required.46 Jails could release a man accused 
of a crime before trial so long as a surety “would guarantee both the 
appearance of the accused at trial and payment of [monetary fines] upon 
conviction.”47 The court would presume the accused guilty if he fled 
before trial, and the surety would be bound to pay the fines attached to the 
accused’s conviction.48 When Parliament passed acts limiting the power 
of bail, it guaranteed several rights for citizens.49  
The founders of the United States brought with them the rights 
associated with bail.50 In modern times, states are free to establish their 
own bail systems, but may be subject to the limitations imposed by the 
Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “[e]xcessive 
bail shall not be required.”51 Indeed, parties have challenged Louisiana’s 
bail statutes before and courts have found such claims unmerited—holding 
that the statutes do not violate parties’ due process rights.52 
                                                                                                             
 44. Gabriel Loupe, Comment, The Lack of Money is the Root of All Evil: 
Louisiana’s Ban on Bail Without Surety, 77 LA. L. REV. 109, 111 (2016). “The 
practice of bail has a history extending back millennia to the early Roman 
Republic.” Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery 
of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 SYRACUSE L. REV. 517, 519–
20 (1983) (internal emphasis omitted). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Loupe, supra note 44, at 112. These included “(1) the Petition of Right, 
which forbade courts to detain subjects without charging them; (2) the Habeas 
Corpus Act of 1679, which created procedural safeguards to prevent lengthy 
pretrial delays; and (3) the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which stated that 
excessive bail ought not be required.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 50. Id. 
 51. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 52. See Broussard v. Parish of Orleans, 318 F.3d 644, 663 (5th Cir. 2003); 
Faulkner v. Gusman, No. 13-6813, 2014 WL 1876213 (E.D. La. May 9, 2014); 
but see Cain v. City of New Orleans, 281 F. Supp. 3d 624, 657 (E.D. La. 2017) 
(holding that a judge’s “institutional interest in maximizing fines and fees [was] 
substantial” and violated Plaintiff’s due process rights). 




A. Authoritative Discretion to Obligate Defendants 
The Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure governs the bail system in 
Louisiana.53 Louisiana law defines “bail” as “the security given by a 
person to assure a defendant’s appearance before the proper court 
whenever required.”54 Barring particular exceptions,55 any person “in 
custody who is charged with the commission of an offense” has the right 
to bail.56 At a pretrial bail hearing, a judge determines a particular 
defendant’s bail.57 The judge’s goal is to set bail at a value that guarantees 
the defendant will return to court for their trial and contemplates the safety 
of the community if the defendant is released pretrial.58  
To determine a proper bail amount, judges consider ten factors from 
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 316.59 Article 313 lists 
additional factors that judges must consider when determining bail for 
certain offenses.60 Despite the consideration of these factors, however, 
                                                                                                             
 53. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. tit. VIII. 
 54. Id. art. 311(1) (2018). 
 55. See id. arts. 313(D), 321(C). 
 56. Id. art. 312(A). 
 57. Id. art. 313. 
 58. Id. art. 316. 
 59. Id. The ten factors are: 
(1) The seriousness of the offense charged, including but not 
limited to whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves 
a controlled dangerous substance. 
(2) The weight of the evidence against the defendant. 
(3) The previous criminal record of the defendant. 
(4) The ability of the defendant to give bail. 
(5) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any other person 
or the community that would be posed by the defendant's 
release. 
(6) The defendant’s voluntary participation in a pretrial drug 
testing program. 
(7) The absence or presence in the defendant of any controlled 
dangerous substance. 
(8) Whether the defendant is currently out on a bail undertaking 
on a previous felony arrest for which he is awaiting institution 
of prosecution, arraignment, trial, or sentencing. 
(9) Any other circumstances affecting the probability of 
defendant’s appearance. 
(10) The type or form of bail. 
Id. 
 60. Id. art. 313(A)(3): 




judges are not required to set a bail for every defendant.61 A judge has 
discretion to deny a defendant bail if there is “clear and convincing 
evidence” that the defendant would flee from the court’s jurisdiction or 
that the defendant’s release would put the community in danger.62 
If the judge grants bail instead of releasing the defendant on their own 
recognizance or denying bail, the defendant is required to pay the amount 
to the court in full.63 The court then holds the payment in “escrow” and 
returns it to the defendant if he is not convicted and appears for all required 
court dates and hearings.64 If the court eventually convicts the defendant, 
the defendant can use the bail payment to pay the fines, fees, and court 
costs imposed at sentencing, and the court can return any remaining money 
after these additional obligations are met.65 Financial problems may arise 
for defendants who cannot pay the full amount when the bail is assigned.66 
                                                                                                             
(3) In addition to the factors listed in Article 316, in determining 
whether the defendant should be admitted to bail pending trial, 
or in determining the conditions of bail, the judge or magistrate 
shall consider the following: 
(a) The criminal history of the defendant. 
(b) The potential threat or danger the defendant poses to the 
victim, the family of the victim, or to any member of the public, 
especially children. 
(c) Documented history or records of any of the following: 
substance abuse by the defendant; threats of suicide by the 
defendant; the defendant’s use of force or threats of use of force 
against any victim; strangulation, forced sex, or controlling the 
activities of any victim by the defendant; or threats to kill. 
Documented history or records may include but are not limited 
to sworn affidavits, police reports, and medical records. 
 61. See id. art. 313(A)(4). 
 62. Id. The statute provides that: 
Following the contradictory hearing and based upon the judge’s 
or magistrate’s review of the factors set forth in 
Subparagraph(A)(3) of this Article, the judge or magistrate may 
order that the defendant not be admitted to bail, upon proof by 
clear and convincing evidence either that the defendant might 
flee, or that the defendant poses an imminent danger to any 
other person or the community. 
Id. 
 63. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Bail, Fines, and Fees, VERA INST. JUST., https://www.vera.org/research 
/bail-fines-and-fees [https://perma.cc/QF7U-HCH9] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 




To avoid pretrial detention, defendants who are unable to pay have a 
secondary option: a bail bondsman.67 
B. Another Smothering Method of Payment Through Bail Bond Offices 
Bail bondsmen are commercial, for-profit, state-licensed agents who 
offer bail bonds.68 If a defendant or his family contracts with a bail 
bondsman, the bondsman acts as a surety for the defendant, paying the 
court the required bail.69 The Louisiana Department of Insurance oversees 
the certification of bail bondsman in the state and requires potential 
bondsmen to meet certain requirements, enroll in courses, take 
examinations, and complete an apprenticeship program.70  
Before paying the defendant’s bail, the bondsman requires that the 
defendant pay a nominal fee up front, usually called a “premium.”71 The 
premium is typically a particular percentage of the set bail.72 In New 
Orleans, for example, bondsmen require 10% of a defendant’s bail as a 
premium.73 A bail bondsman may also have the authority to collect 
additional fees from the defendant for the prosecutor, the sheriff, the public 
defender, and the court.74 The premium and fees associated with 
contracting a bail bondsman are non-refundable.75 Even if a defendant 
makes every court appearance and is never prosecuted or convicted, the 
bail bond company never returns the premium or fee payments.76 If a 
defendant misses a court appearance or violates another condition of bail, 
                                                                                                             
 67. Id. 
 68. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See LA. REV. STAT. § 22:1574 (2018). To become a bail bond producer, an 
applicant must be free of felony convictions and must complete the Apprentice 
Program by working for a licensed bail bond producer for three consecutive months. 
Id. Applicants must also complete a prelicensing program course before their 
apprenticeship is finished. Id. § 22:1571. See generally Bail Bond Apprentice 
Program Information, LA. DEP’T INS., https://www.ldi.la.gov/industry/producer-
adjuster/license-application/bail-bond-apprentice-program [https://perma.cc/X8ZK 
-6Q7E] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018). 
 71. Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33, at 6. 
 72. Bail, Fines, and Fees, supra note 66. 
 73. Other cities and parishes around the state also require 10% as a premium. Id. 
 74. Id. The bail bond office includes the additional fees in the cost assessed 
to the defendant and then forwards the payments to these various state agencies 
and officials. The bail bond office will often require additional monthly payments 
from the defendant. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 




the court can remand him to jail and force him to pay additional fees to the 
court.77  
No matter which method a defendant chooses—paying the court 
directly, contracting with a bail bondsman, or not paying the bail and going 
to jail—the difficulties are exacerbated if the defendant is impoverished 
like over 20% of the state’s population.78 Money that a defendant uses to 
pay bail or a bail bondsman could be saved for other necessary expenses, 
such as rent, utilities, or groceries.79 If the defendant cannot pay either the 
court or a bail bondsman, he is held in jail.80 Withheld from everyday life, 
defendants often lose their jobs, homes, cars, or custody of their children 
while jailed.81 
Louisiana’s “cash bail” system is detrimental to the indigent 
population and contributes to the state’s high incarceration rate.82 
Louisiana’s poverty rate is exorbitantly high83 and research shows that 
requiring excessive bail and nominal fees from defendants perpetuates a 
continuing cycle of poverty, potentially wrongfully induces guilty pleas, 
and crowds jails.84 
                                                                                                             
 77. Id. 
 78. Louisiana, TALK POVERTY, https://talkpoverty.org/state-year-report 
/louisiana-2017-report/ [https://perma.cc/Q786-J2CW] (last visited Aug. 2, 2018) 
(reporting 2017 poverty statistics). Over 20% of Louisianans are in poverty. Id. 
 79. Bail Fail: Why the U.S. Should End the Practice of Using Money For 
Bail, JUST. POLICY INST. 13 (2012). 
 80. Bail, Fines, and Fees, supra note 66. 
 81. See generally Bail Fail, supra note 79; Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf, 
Detaining the Poor: How money bail perpetuates and endless cycle of poverty and 
jail time, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (May 10, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy 
.org/reports/incomejails.html [https://perma.cc/V78N-WKWJ]; Shaun Ossei-
Owusu, Poverty’s Punishment: America’s Oppressive Bail Regime, AM. PROSPECT 
(Nov. 18, 2016), http://prospect.org/article/poverty%E2%80%99s-punishment-
america%E2%80%99s-oppressive-bail-regime [https://perma.cc/KBB8-58TW]; 
Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.ny 
times.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/7YNH-GHJ5]; 
Robin Steinberg, Time for a national fund that chips away at money bail and stops 
criminalizing poverty, USA TODAY (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com 
/story/opinion/policing/spotlight/2017/11/28/time-national-fund-chips-away-money-
bail-and-stops-criminalizing-poverty/890484001/ [https://perma.cc/5KMQ-HP5G]. 
 82. See generally Bail, Fines, and Fees, supra note 66; Laisne, Wool & 
Henrichson, supra note 33. 
 83. Louisiana, supra note 78. 
 84. See Laisne, Wool & Henrichson, supra note 33. 




II. JURISDICTIONS ARE ABANDONING CASH BAIL AND MOVING TO RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
Although Louisiana has the second highest incarceration rate per 
capita in the country,85 other states also face problems of mass 
incarceration.86 In recent years, many jurisdictions reduced jail 
populations and implemented policies so as to not detain defendants 
pretrial solely because of an inability to pay.87 These states’ efforts 
demonstrate the alternative bail systems available to Louisiana.88 
A. New Jersey Eliminates Cash Bail and Adopts the Arnold Foundation’s 
Public Safety Assessment Tool 
New Jersey had a high pretrial detention rate and a high percentage of 
people living in poverty,89 prompting the state to make significant changes 
to its bail system in early 2017.90 One study found that at any given point 
in time, around 75% of New Jersey’s jail population was simply awaiting 
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trial.91 Of the pretrial inmates, the average length of incarceration was over 
ten months.92 Further, 40% of the defendants in jail were there because 
they could not afford bail of $2,500 or less.93 
On November 4, 2014, New Jersey voters approved a constitutional 
amendment to take effect on January 1, 2017.94 The amendment declared 
that, “All persons shall, before conviction, be eligible for pretrial release” 
and provided the legislature with the power to “establish” a system of 
pretrial release.95 Instead of a cash bail system, New Jersey courts now use 
a “risk assessment” analytic tool to determine whether a particular 
defendant is a flight risk or a danger to society.96  
The risk assessment tool, called the “Public Safety Assessment tool” 
(“PSA”) is “a pretrial risk assessment tool that is designed to assist judges 
in making release/detention determinations.”97 Created by the Laura and 
John Arnold Foundation,98 the tool considers a number of factors related 
to the defendant to determine whether the court should release or detain 
the defendant.99 The factors focus on the defendant’s prior convictions and 
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failures to appear, determining the “risk factor” associated with allowing 
a defendant to remain out of jail before his trial.100 
The Laura and John Arnold Foundation developed the PSA tool by 
compiling statistics from more than 1.5 million cases in over 300 
jurisdictions throughout the United States.101 Analyzing that data, 
developers identified the factors or characteristics most predictive of 
whether a defendant will commit a new crime—violent or nonviolent—or 
fail to appear in court.102 The factors include, among others: whether the 
current offense is violent; whether prior convictions exist; the defendant’s 
age at the time of arrest; and the defendant’s history of failure to appear in 
court.103 The PSA does not consider factors like race, ethnicity, or 
geography.104 
Today, after a defendant is arrested in New Jersey, a pretrial detention 
officer interviews the defendant.105 The officer reads the defendant’s 
criminal record, asks questions to obtain the information needed for the 
PSA, and “plugs in” the answers the algorithm requires.106 The tool 
outputs a number that determines the defendant’s risk factor, which in turn 
determines whether the defendant must remain in jail until trial.107 The tool 
computes the defendant’s risk factor by comparing his information to over 
1.5 million criminal cases in its databases.108 A judge then reports the 
resulting assessment at a hearing for the defendant, which must take place 
within 48 hours of the initial arrest.109  
If the assessment determines that the defendant is not a risk, the 
defendant may return home and is placed in pretrial services.110 The 
pretrial services office notifies the defendant of upcoming court dates and 
may include monitoring services, such as GPS tracking devices.111 If the 
defendant’s assessment number is high, indicating he is a high-risk 
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defendant, he is not allowed to leave jail, and instead the court detains him 
without bail.112 
Since the constitutional amendment, the New Jersey jail population 
has decreased, leading reform advocates and state officials to hail the New 
Jersey program as a success.113 In July 2017, New Jersey released reports 
analyzing the number of people in its jails,114 which showed the number 
of pretrial defendants in county jails dropped by more than 33% in 
comparison to the year before the bill’s passage.115 Another study found 
the pretrial population of New Jersey jails had dropped 20% in the first six 
months of the PSA’s usage.116 Following New Jersey’s successful 
adoption of the tool, other jurisdictions around the country have also begun 
using the tool in their own criminal justice systems.117 
B. Other Jurisdictions Are Buying into Risk Assessment 
New Jersey is not the only jurisdiction to adopt the Arnold 
Foundation’s PSA.118 Over 30 jurisdictions have adopted the tool in some 
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fashion, and some of these jurisdictions demonstrate alternative, less-
expansive approaches compared to New Jersey’s dramatic overhaul.119 
Kentucky adopted bail reform throughout the state in January 2017.120 
The Kentucky Supreme Court signed an order creating the Administrative 
Release Program and adopted three “categories of risk” for use in pretrial 
service assessments based on criteria from the PSA risk assessment tool.121 
By assigning a score from 2 to 12 to a defendant, the pretrial service officer 
reports that the defendant is either a low-, moderate-, or high-risk 
defendant.122 The risk categories correspond to a recommended result: jails 
release low-risk defendants on their own recognizance with conditions; 
jails release moderate-risk defendants on their own recognizance with 
supervision; and jails release high-risk defendants only upon judicial 
review and with supervision.123 The Kentucky Supreme Court stated that 
the purpose of the program was to “expedite pretrial release of low to 
moderate risk defendants” and to “reserv[e] resources for higher-risk 
defendants.”124 The Supreme Court hoped the program would “increase 
efficiency” of its pretrial supervision.125 
In Arizona, few courts used pretrial services and a risk assessment 
system prior to 2017, but in April 2017, the Arizona Supreme Court urged 
judges to embrace a statewide risk assessment system.126 Arizona’s risk 
assessment tool is also based on the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety 
Assessment tool and relies on nine variables, which include the 
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defendant’s prior felony convictions and prior failures to appear within the 
last two years.127 
Harris County, Texas, also began using the PSA after a federal judge 
mandated its implementation.128 Harris County courts came under scrutiny 
in early 2017 when arrestees of the county brought suit in federal court 
against the county court system and sheriffs alleging violation of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses.129 In ODonnell v. Harris County, 
Texas, the district court judge found in favor of the plaintiffs and 
overturned the county’s bail system, finding the system disproportionately 
affected the county’s indigent populations.130  
The judge found that Harris County jails detained 40% of people 
arrested on misdemeanor charges from bail hearings until trials were 
completed.131 In June 2017, after the United States Supreme Court refused 
their request for an emergency block, Harris County officials stated they 
would comply with the ruling and allow defendants detained for inability 
to pay bail to enter pretrial services.132 Despite Harris County’s reluctance, 
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however, recent research suggests that the other Texas counties and 
jurisdictions around the country should follow suit.133 
Additionally, although not using the Arnold Foundation’s PSA, other 
jurisdictions have passed laws or rules—either in the past or in recent 
years—to reform pretrial practices by decreasing or eliminating the use of 
cash bail.134 For instance, the District of Columbia amended its bail laws 
in the early 1990s.135 Now, “although secured money bail is still available 
under the D.C. Code, such bail is almost never imposed in misdemeanor 
cases.”136 More recently, Alaska passed a law in July 2016, which portions 
went in to effect on January 1, 2018, that created the Pretrial Enforcement 
Division.137 The Division’s purpose is to use a pretrial assessment 
instrument to determine the risk of defendants and place them in one of 
three categories, which in turn determines whether they are eligible for 
pretrial release on their own recognizance.138 One study suggested that 
Alaska taxpayers could save $380 million.139 In July of 2017, the 
Maryland Court of Appeals created Court Rule 4-216.1, which “permit[s] 
the release of a defendant pending trial except upon a finding by a [judge] 
that . . . there is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant . . . will not 
appear when required, or . . . will be a danger to . . . the community.”140 
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California is another example, where Governor Brown signed a bill into 
law that will completely eliminate cash bail when it takes effect in October 
of 2019.141 The law will force courts to establish pretrial assessment 
services and will generally require that defendants arrested for non-violent 
and low-level offenses be released within 12 hours of being arrested.142 
All of these jurisdictions, whether adopting the PSA or other pretrial 
assessment strategies, have made strides to reform their bail practices.143 
While critics may argue that these jurisdictions are not similar to the 
Pelican State, research from Louisiana’s neighbor, Texas, suggests that 
risk assessment tools may be useful anywhere.144 
C. A Neighbor State’s Encouraging Research into Risk Assessment Tools 
Texas A&M University’s Public Policy Research Institute released a 
report on Texas’s pretrial practices in March 2017.145 The report focused 
on comparing cash bail and risk assessment-based pretrial systems, and 
analyzed over 3.5 years of criminal case data from Tarrant and Travis 
counties.146 The data highlighted five critical findings.147 
First, the report found that a pretrial risk assessment tool built around 
an algorithm could successfully predict a defendant’s chance of failure on 
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bond.148 At the time, Tarrant County and Travis County were using the 
Ohio Risk Assessment System: Pretrial Assessment Tool, “ORAS-
PAT.”149 The ORAS-PAT required an extensive interview with the 
defendant to determine his flight risk and danger to society.150 The report 
concluded that if police used a risk assessment algorithm tool instead of 
the interview system, then a higher assessment score accurately portrayed 
a greater chance of bond forfeiture and new criminal activity.151  
Second, the report found using a statistical algorithm making 
decisions to release or detain defendants instead of the interview-based 
risk assessment tool would save money.152 The report concluded that the 
ORAS-PAT assessment tool was an inefficient use of funds.153 The risk 
assessment algorithm could obtain similar results as the costly interview 
based system for a fraction of the cost and resources.154 The Arnold 
Foundation’s PSA tool is specifically mentioned in the report as a practical 
risk assessment tool and a more viable alternative than the ORAS-PAT.155 
Third, the study found that risk assessment tools resulted in more 
accurate classifications of defendants.156 In terms of classifying defendants 
as low-risk or high-risk, under a cash bail system, the judges “matched” 
the actual risk for defendants 72% of the time.157 Under a risk assessment 
tool using a risk assessment algorithm, the matching to actual risk 
improved to 77%.158 This finding shows that with risk assessment 
algorithms, jails would release fewer high-risk defendants and detain 
fewer low-risk defendants.159 
Fourth, the costs of using a risk assessment tool are more than offset 
by savings in other areas when defendants are properly classified 
pretrial.160 Although pretrial service programs cost 1.5 times more with a 
                                                                                                             
 148. Id. at xiii. 
 149. See id. 
 150. Ohio Risk Assessment System, OHIO DEP’T REHABILITATION & 
CORRECTION, http://www.drc.ohio.gov/oras [https://perma.cc/RX86-2364] (last 
visited Aug. 2, 2018). The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
developed the ORAS-PAT assessment tool. Id. 
 151. Carmichael et al., supra note 133, at xiii. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at xiv. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 




risk assessment tool, the costs in every other category decrease.161 For 
instance, case processing costs, such as re-arrest, court hearings, 
prosecution, and indigent defense, are 5% lower when courts use a risk 
assessment tool.162 The monetary costs to victims decrease by 72%.163 
Costs of detaining defendants decrease by 23%.164 Additionally, the costs 
assessed to the court and judicial system incurred by misclassifying the 
risk of defendants are 76% lower.165 Most importantly, the total costs of 
all the categories combined are 30% lower than if courts used a cash bail 
system.166 These savings are mostly attributed to lower rates of new 
criminal activity—high-risk defendants could not commit crimes because 
they were detained, and low-risk defendants that were released were less 
likely to commit crimes.167 
Finally, the report concluded that use of a risk assessment tool is more 
fair for defendants because it considers their risk to society’s safety rather 
than merely their ability to pay.168 When a risk assessment algorithm 
determines whether to detain a defendant rather than the defendant’s 
inability to pay bail, half as many people are incarcerated on a bail of 
$2,000 or less, one-third as many people are held on bails of $500 or less, 
and ten times as many people are released on their own recognizance.169 
The report adds to the great body of contemporary evidence promoting 
risk assessment systems.170 
Many jurisdictions have realized the issues associated with cash bail 
systems and have adopted the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety 
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Assessment tool or another similar risk assessment system.171 If Louisiana 
adopts the Arnold Foundation’s Public Safety Assessment tool like other 
jurisdictions have, the state will adopt contemporary, progressive bail 
bond reform.172 
III. VALUABLE REASONS FOR LOUISIANA TO REPLACE OUTDATED CASH 
BAIL 
Louisiana has already shown an interest in assessing its criminal 
justice system and incarcerating more efficiently.173 To get “more public 
safety for each dollar spent,” the legislature created the Louisiana Justice 
Reinvestment Task Force, which studies Louisiana’s criminal justice 
system and makes recommendations to safely cut the costs of operation.174 
The Task Force and the Louisiana Department of Corrections already 
support LARNA175 and TIGER,176 two risk assessment tools used to 
determine the risk of recidivism for prisoners released after serving time 
post-conviction.177 Further, while this Comments suggests the legislature 
should take statewide action, smaller jurisdictions, like Orleans Parish, 
have already taken steps to reduce the use of cash bail.178 
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If Louisiana follows trends from other jurisdictions that have adopted 
the Public Safety Assessment tool, the state will achieve its other goals 
including lowering jail populations, reducing jail detention costs, and 
stopping the indiscriminate hindrance the cash bail system places on 
indigent Louisianans.179  
A. Louisiana Could Cash in on Lower Jail Populations 
If Louisiana courts could assess defendants detained pretrial using a 
risk assessment tool, courts could safely release many defendants on their 
own recognizance until trial.180 It is estimated that city and parish jails in 
Louisiana detain just over 14,000 defendants pretrial.181 Although no 
available data directly shows how many courts statewide detain 
defendants because of inability to pay bail, the number is likely similar to 
other reported statistics showing courts detain nearly a third of pretrial 
inmates because of financial inabilities.182  
For example, of the people detained in the Orleans Justice Center—
Orleans Parish’s jail—in March 2016, the state had convicted only 10%; 
jails were detaining the other 90% pretrial.183 In 2015, New Orleans judges 
imprisoned 2,482 people solely because they could not pay their court 
costs and fees.184 In 2015, three out of ten jail beds in Orleans Parish were 
filled by defendants due to their inability to afford the bail set by the 
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court.185 If courts examined the defendants under a risk assessment tool, 
some would be eligible to be released on their own recognizance.186 
Most defendants booked into the criminal justice system both 
nationally and in Louisiana are charged with crimes that do not carry a 
potential life sentence.187 If Louisiana adopts a risk assessment system 
similar to New Jersey, therefore, most of the pretrial defendants will be 
eligible for release by the risk assessment tool.188 New Jersey saw a 20% 
reduction in its statewide jail population in the six months following the 
implementation of the PSA.189 Louisiana could see a similar reduction in 
its jail population if the state adopts the PSA.190 If jails released 20% of 
the 14,000 pretrial defendants, equal to New Jersey’s reduction, Louisiana 
courts would release 2,800 defendants safely on their own recognizance 
within six months of the PSA’s implementation.191 
B. With Lower Jail Populations, Louisiana Could Save on Detention 
Costs 
With fewer defendants in jails, the cost of maintaining Louisiana jails 
would reduce.192 One report estimates the average daily cost of an inmate 
in a Louisiana jail is $24.39, by far the lowest allocation of any state.193 
Thus, the average annual cost of detaining one defendant in a local jail is 
estimated as $8,902.194 Presuming that Louisiana’s jail populations 
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decline, like in New Jersey, the jail population could reduce by 20% in six 
months.195 The decrease in jail costs for Louisiana parishes and cities could 
be nearly $25 million across the state.196 
Jurisdictions only recently began adopting risk-based assessment 
tools,197 thus, the statistics released reflect only months of reform—not 
reductions following a full fiscal year or more time for the new system to 
fully integrate itself into statistics.198 Even the example used—a 20% 
reduction in New Jersey—comes after only six months of the tool’s 
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usage.199 If the calculations are remotely accurate, parishes in Louisiana 
could see budget reductions that surpass these preliminary figures. 
The New Orleans cash bail system already runs a deficit.200 The Vera 
Institute of Justice in New Orleans gathered data on the money that the 
local government collected when defendants paid bail and the costs 
associated with jailing defendants pretrial.201 The results showed that the 
cost to the government, which is the cost of detaining defendants who 
could not pay or had violated the terms of their bail, was higher than the 
obtainable revenue from those defendants’ bail payments.202 
In New Orleans, bail bondsmen charge a 10% premium for bonds,203 
plus an additional fee of 3% of a defendant’s bail, which is then distributed 
to the court, the district attorney, the public defender, and the sheriff.204 In 
2015, New Orleans defendants paid over $6.4 million to bail bondsmen; 
bondsmen then split those fees between themselves and the government 
entities that receive a fraction.205 From this amount, the courts, 
prosecutors, public defenders, and sheriffs collected a total of $4.5 million 
from defendants and their families.206  
During that same period, the City of New Orleans spent $6.4 million 
solely detaining defendants that could not pay their bail.207 The city thus 
spent almost $2 million more to jail the indigent defendants who could not 
pay their bail than the involved criminal justice agencies collected as 
revenue from requiring bail be paid.208 Adopting a risk-assessment-based 
system would alleviate such costs that parish and local jail systems incur 
around the state. Additionally, only low-risk defendants would be eligible 
for release, meaning that courts would more effectively target those 
defendants deemed high-risk because of their potential to commit another 
crime or flee the jurisdiction for pretrial detention.209 
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C. Risk Assessment Tools Mean Safer Streets 
The PSA identifies high-risk defendants as those that are most likely 
to flee or commit another crime.210 The defendants that the tool selects for 
pretrial detention, therefore, will be those that are most dangerous to 
society.211 Rather than a defendant’s ability to pay being the sole 
determination, the factors important to the safety of the community will 
determine which defendants jails should detain.212 Society need not fear 
because the defendants released on their own recognizance will be 
judicially determined to be low-risk, and the defendants that are detained 
will be determined to be those that are more likely to endanger the 
community.213 This logic, however, is not without its challengers.214 
Opponents of risk-assessment-based systems and proponents of cash 
bail systems spread the “persistent myth in America that money bail—and 
the dogged bondsman who will track down absconders—makes 
communities safer.”215 Predictably, opponents of reform continue to argue 
that eliminating cash bail systems threatens the safety of communities.216 
Opponents’ concerns are that bail reform legislation will lead to the release 
of criminal defendants who will continue to commit crimes if jails are not 
detaining them.217  
While there are examples of jails releasing low-risk defendants 
nationwide on their own recognizance and prosecutors then charging the 
defendants with crimes while awaiting their trial,218 defendants under cash 
bail systems often commit crimes after satisfying their bail payment.219 
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One particularly gruesome example occurred when Matthew Darby 
allegedly killed his ex-girlfriend, Alina Sheykhet, while on bail for two 
separate charges from two different jurisdictions, one for rape and the 
other for criminal trespass.220 Darby had bonded out on both offenses, each 
worth $10,000.221 The rape charge, which came about nine months prior, 
related to an incident in which Darby broke into Sheykhet’s apartment and 
raped her.222 In Wisconsin, police arrested Andy “Man Man” Davis after 
he allegedly fired 30 shots into a home, leaving two people injured.223 
Davis, just two months prior, had posted his $6,000 bond for a 2015 
shooting incident.224 
Louisiana has seen similar difficulties with defendants released after 
paying bail.225 In Monroe, police arrested Blake Phillips and charged him 
with stalking a woman, whom he reportedly threatened to kill.226 After 
posting bail and agreeing to a protective order, Phillips was charged for 
violating the protective order.227 The Ouachita Correctional Center released 
Phillips again after he posted the $7,000 bail for the second charge.228  
In Baton Rouge, Louisiana State Police shot and killed Jordan Frazier, 
who was out on bail for a charge of possession with intent to distribute 
ecstasy, after he exited a vehicle with a firearm during a traffic stop.229 
Frazier had previously been convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia, 
simple criminal damage to property, criminal trespass, and aggravated 
assault.230 Telly Hankton, whom police once called the most dangerous 
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criminal in New Orleans, shot and killed a rival gangster while out on a $1 
million bail for a murder charge.231  
These accounts are instances in which a defendant avoided detention by 
paying bail and was subsequently involved in another crime. Instead of 
money determining whether a particular defendant should be allowed 
pretrial release, the PSA tool only considers factors relevant to the likelihood 
that a defendant will commit another crime if released pretrial.232 In Lucas 
County, Ohio, a jurisdiction that has adopted the tool, statistics show that 
the tool is effectively deciding whom the courts can release safely.233 
Comparing arrests before and after the tool’s implementation, the county 
reported that the number of pretrial defendants arrested for other crimes had 
been cut in half.234 Furthermore, the number of pretrial defendants skipping 
their court dates dropped by over 10%.235 Ultimately, the arguments against 
implementation of a risk assessment tool fall short of proving cash bail’s 
superiority. 
D. Bail Bondsmen’s Arguments Do Not Pay Out 
Bail bondsmen argue that bail bond reform adversely affects them, as 
it is detrimental to their business.236 In New Orleans alone, commercial 
bail bond companies receive $4.7 million from defendants each year.237 
Kirk Shaw, a bail bondsman from New Jersey, after the Bail Reform and 
Speedy Trial Act passed, articulated his role in the criminal justice system 
as that of “a short-term loan officer,” explaining that the fee he charges is 
akin to “interest on your loan.”238 Shaw further explains that under “[t]he 
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old system, you’d have skin in the game,” however, after New Jersey’s 
Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act, the state’s court system is “a joke.”239 
Although instances of defendants released without bail committing crimes 
while they await trial exist, despite the likely profit-motivated arguments 
of bail bondsmen, no evidence exists that collecting bail money from 
defendants is an effective crime deterrent.240 
The bail reform evidence shows that defendants released without bail 
are just as likely to appear in court and avoid new arrests as people who 
are able to pay bail.241 Using a risk assessment tool is safer than using a 
cash bail system.242 The Vera Institute’s data shows that defendants 
unnecessarily detained pretrial are more likely to commit future crimes.243 
If defendants are determined to be low-risk, allowing them to return to 
their lives while they await trial may decrease this likelihood.244 Risk 
assessment tools also prevent high-risk defendants with means to pay bail 
from purchasing their freedom.245 No conclusive evidence exists that 
requiring defendants to pay bail makes communities safer—in fact, there 
is evidence that pretrial detention has the opposite effect.246 With no 
persuasive evidence to the contrary, adopting a risk assessment-based 
system is economically and morally sound. 
CONCLUSION 
Louisiana has made recent strides in criminal reform, yet still has one 
of the highest incarceration rates in the entire world.247 By reducing 
Louisiana’s jail population, the parishes and cities of Louisiana would 
reduce spending on unnecessarily detaining defendants.248 Louisiana has 
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already begun to recognize and address the problems of its criminal justice 
system,249 and bail bond reform could be a systematic change to push 
Louisiana toward its goal.250  
To reduce the number of pretrial defendants jails detain solely because 
they cannot afford to pay bail, and to ensure that jails detain only the 
defendants that are most dangerous to society, Louisiana should adopt the 
Arnold Foundation Public Safety Assessment tool or a similar risk 
assessment tool. The tool will efficiently reduce the number of people 
imprisoned unnecessarily, reducing jail populations around the state, and 
lowering expenses associated with detaining defendants.251  
The Louisiana Legislature should abolish the discriminatory and 
ineffective cash bail system in its entirety, and following the example of 
other jurisdictions, replace it with a system that more appropriately focuses 
on pretrial risk assessment. This change will bring Louisiana to the 
forefront of the nationwide bail bond reform movement, ultimately 
benefitting the state both socially and economically. 
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